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# Contents

**Executive summary** ........................................................................................................ 4  
**Introduction to the EUCROSS project** ...................................................................... 5  
**Europeanisation** .......................................................................................................... 8  
**European identity** ....................................................................................................... 13  
  - Conceptualising European identity ........................................................................ 13  
  - Predictors of European identification ................................................................... 15  
**Cross-border practices** ............................................................................................... 18  
  - Physical mobility across borders ......................................................................... 19  
  - Non-physical mobility across borders ................................................................ 24  
**Cosmopolitanism** ....................................................................................................... 29  
  - Dimension of cosmopolitan attitudes ................................................................ 30  
**Conclusion: further challenges for the EUCROSS project** ....................................... 32  
  - Expanding or escaping the Deutschian legacy? .................................................... 32  
  - The dilemma of EU legitimacy .............................................................................. 33  
  - The exclusionary and/or inclusionary effects of Europeanisation ....................... 34  
  - The causes and conditions of a ‘European cosmopolitanism’ .......................... 35  
**References** ................................................................................................................... 37
Executive summary

This paper illustrates the research questions, the main underlying concepts and the relevant literature of the EUCROSS project. The project examines the relationship between the manifold activities of EU residents (nationals, mobile EU citizens, and third-country nationals) across the borders of nation states and their collective identities. Specifically, the project intends to:

1) map out individuals’ cross-border practices as an effect of European integration and globalisation; 2) assess the impact of these practices on collective identifications (also controlling for the inverse causal process). Which cross-border practices are more likely to foster some form of identification with the EU – e.g., contacts with foreign friends and/or unwanted foreigners, periods of labour mobility abroad, business and tourist travel, or consumer relations with international companies? Under which contextual and individual conditions do these experiences promote a higher sensitivity to ‘Europe’ – rather than the ‘local’ or the ‘global’ – as an identity catalyst? Which social groups are more prone to adopt a European mindset in the wake of the Europeanisation of everyday life?

In addressing these questions, we use the concepts of ‘Europeanisation’, ‘European identity’, ‘cross-border practices’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ drawing on and elaborating from their meaning in the contemporary social science literature – and especially in sociology, anthropology, political science and social psychology. Overall, we find that seldom are these concepts treated altogether specifying the link between spatially and culturally situated behaviours on the one hand and collective identifications and value orientations on the other. Moreover, few studies examine socio-cultural Europeanisation and supernational identifications comparatively, and none includes simultaneously native and immigrant populations, who in fact may attest of different modalities in which the behaviour-identity link can take place.
Introduction to the EUCROSS project

The building of the European Union has taken place amidst dramatic social change brought on by transformations linked to broader currents of globalisation. European citizens often find it difficult centring themselves in this turbulent world, a fact reflected in their ambiguous feelings towards the EU. Sometimes the European Union is seen as rescuing the European nation state, providing a new layer of governance in an otherwise uncontrollable, global space and its wildly competitive international system; sometimes, it is seen as a hostile Trojan horse for globalisation, sweeping away national and local cultures, and trampling established models of economy and society. This ambiguity puts a great threat to the legitimacy of the EU. Yet despite decades of study devoted to the European Union, we in truth know very little about the ongoing Europeanisation of Europeans’ lives, both in political-cultural (i.e., identification and support for the EU and its values) and social terms (i.e., cross-border practices and experiences specific to the new European space).

In parallel with globalisation, European Union policies have considerably widened the scope of ordinary citizens’ social practices beyond the borders of nation states. Europeans today can travel, work, study and retire abroad freely (i.e., without visas and other state permits), using low cost regional airlines made possible by EU deregulation; they can vote for the European Parliament and local governments in any member state, regardless of their nationality; they can collect pensions as foreign residents at a local post office; they can buy property securely within a mutually recognised legal system; they can shop online in another EU member state without having to pass through custom offices. All this opens possibilities of interaction with other Europeans, even while sometimes staying in one’s own country. Many of these aspects of their everyday life might simply be put down to internationalisation or globalisation. But these new relationships and experiences now often have a distinct regional – i.e., European – scale and intensity.

Rights facilitating these practices, we know, are amongst the most important fruits of European integration. When EU citizens are asked ‘what does the EU mean to you’ by Eurobarometer, the majority of respondents state that it is ‘the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU’ (European Commission 2009, 85). Other policies (defence of democracy, promotion of human and minority rights), in fact, are much less recognised
and appreciated. The EU often imputes this lack of recognition to a question of better information and democratic transparency. Moreover, European institutions have long been engaged in an uphill battle to promote the everyday benefits of EU membership through branding campaigns and funding for cultural events and cross-national associations offering symbols for identification with the EU project. Europe in these terms is meant to embody the highest values and aspirations of a global, enlightened cosmopolitanism (Beck and Grande 2004).

Such issues are generally debated by scholars dealing with the slippery concept of ‘European identity’. Officially, the European Union fosters an identity that is mostly conceived in terms of universal democratic ideals and values. These are thought to sit well with a more global ‘cosmopolitanism’, but are equally claimed to be incarnated in the European construction. Above all, these values – reasons to identify with the EU – are not meant to clash with national and local identifications, but complement them, in the same way that European citizenship is meant to complement national citizenship. To this end, the EU has been producing a vast array of discourses, information services, and cultural events designed to underline the ‘best of Europe’ (i.e., the highest European values) to often sceptical national populations. Via laws and directives, the EU also facilitates the whole new battery of ‘mundane’ Europeanised practices – including personal freedom of movement, consumer and property rights, associational and business opportunities, cross-border openings – that may or may not be acknowledged by their recipients as the direct effects of EU membership and European citizenship.

Assessing the association and reciprocal influences of these values and practices promoted by the EU is the central goal of the EUCROSS project. Using quantitative and qualitative tools, we aim at mapping simultaneously the forms and degree of collective political identifications and the forms and degrees of internationalisation of everyday life among European citizens and residents. Via our network of six national partners (Italy, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Britain and Romania), we shall measure the variations of EU identifications and Europeanised practices across the continent, from South to North, and from highly to less highly globalised national contexts. We will consider the interaction of changing national identities with international influences, and explore how and why some people are more likely to identify with the EU rather than with local or global entities. We will control for the impact of age, gender, and social class differences on internationalisation and Europeanisation. And we will investigate how Europe looks to residents sometimes seen as outsiders: European citizens from a new member state (Romania) and residents from a candidate member state and the EU’s largest source of immigration (Turkey).

The EUCROSS project will first and foremost furnish a large-scale, unique and independent quantitative survey, fleshed out by qualitative follow-up interviews that will be publicly available for secondary analysis to all scholars in the field. It will seek to advance existing studies on sociological Europeanisation by going beyond conventional data, such as the surveys provided by Eurobarometer, and by taking its findings deep into a detailed breakdown of the changing everyday life and social practices of Europeans. Moreover, it will extend a realm of research on the internationalisation of European societies that has mostly been limited to social theoretical debate rather than empirically
established findings. This study will also plug directly into current efforts in European social survey work and represent an exemplary piece of carefully designed, comparative, mixed-methods in sociology.

As a first step towards these goals, this state of the art report offers an interdisciplinary synthesis of relevant literature to the project paying particular care to four central concepts: Europeanisation, European identity, cross-border practices and cosmopolitanism.

The first section on Europeanisation covers predominantly the political science literature on Europeanisation and European integration, as well as literature on globalisation in relation to Europe. This section will also draw on basic literature on the development of the nation state, European governance and the most recent sociological and anthropological work on the European Union and Europe. Literature on transnationalism – another key concept – spans between this section and the section on cross-border practices. Here, the theoretical discussion focuses on the link between Europeanisation and transnational practices. In general, we seek to pull away from the political science approach to Europeanisation and move toward a sociological alternative that looks at the idea of Europeanisation ‘from below’. Dealing with Europeanisation in a sociological way leads naturally to issues such as identity formation and cross-border practices in a European/EU context, as well as questions of how citizens of the EU are perceiving the politically promoted values and the EU’s influence on spatial mobility.

The section on European identity covers the most important and relevant works on the prospects of such an identity. Literature in this section ranges from theoretical and conceptual approaches to identity, to studies looking at public opinion based on Eurobarometer surveys. As one of the purposes of the EUCROSS project is to fine-tune research on ‘European identification’ empirically, we focus particularly on case studies building on innovative methods beyond standard data sources such as Eurobarometer. As we point out, the concept of European identity is highly contested – both in its theoretical foundation and in its methodological operationalisation – and some of the literature here represents highly critical views on the general quest to grasp with a European identity.

Literature on cross-border practices has mainly been selected with a focus on behaviour/practices in the European field/space. This includes physical and virtual mobility within Europe. Importantly, the literature does not only represent spatial mobility but the entire range of phenomena extending beyond borders such as international friendships, family network, intermarriage, tourist experiences, international media and cultural consumption. Some of the literature also deals with mobility/migration in relation to demographic backgrounds, culture and social class differences in order to later discuss and analyse the impact of these variables on Europeanisation.

The literature on cosmopolitanism has been selected with a focus on values. The notion of cosmopolitanism is primarily important as a conceptual tool to discuss European values in relation to more global values and whether, as is sometimes argued, the basic principles on which the EU is founded embody a preliminary form of cosmopolitanism. The existing literature is therefore largely philosophical, but emerging empirical studies
seek to test whether cosmopolitan attitudes can be linked to EU citizens’ freedom, cross-border practices and related transnational experiences.

In a closing section, we look at the ‘cutting edge’ in current research in this field, in terms of four questions: the legacy of ‘Deutschian’ approaches; the dilemma of EU legitimacy; the inclusionary and/or exclusionary effects of Europeanisation; and the conditions and causes of a ‘European’ cosmopolitanism.

**Europeanisation**

The term ‘Europeanisation’ has first been coined and later monopolised by political scientists and legal analysts interested in how national legislation is influenced by and adapts to the EU legal and political system (Green Cowles et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003; Falkner 2003; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Martinsen 2005; Graziano and Vink 2008). While some scholars have protested this narrow policy-centred view within EU studies (Radaelli 2000; Olsen 2002), such an approach has tended to sideline a very significant effort by anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists to offer an alternative, and more encompassing definition of Europeanisation: that is, one that might consider the full range of cultural, social, economic and political effects of the European Union building process on the everyday lives of European citizens (Díez Medrano 2008; Favell and Guiraudon 2009).

The political science literature – with the exception of a few works that take seriously the question of the building of the European Union as a spatially grounded regional integration process (Mattli 1999; Rodriguez-Pose 2002; Bartolini 2005; Katzenstein 2005) – argues that although Europeanisation cannot be treated as a simple synonym for European integration, this term must be understood and discussed against the many internal processes that the EU has brought with it. Hence, in order for the concept to have meaning, it is important to be able to specify Europeanisation as the direct or indirect effects of European Union (i.e., ‘EU-isation’) (Flockhart 2010), and not conflate it, as is sometimes the case, with studies looking at the making of ‘Europe’ historically or culturally in a wider sense.

Without doubt, the mainstream efforts of the political science literature on Europeanisation have opened doors and built links to how sociologists, or others interested in the ‘bottom-up’ dynamics of European integration, might look at the subject. The social-constructivist approach to European integration emphasised the constitutive effect of Europeising norms, values and identities on European political actors (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001), also through elite socialisation (Checkel 2007; Hooghe 2005). Following this, there has been a conscious attempt to introduce a more sociological mode of thinking into traditional policy and governance questions (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Jenson and Mérand 2010). We might also point to the mobilisation literature on Europeanisation, that has looked at how European political opportunity structures have impacted European political action (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Guiraudon 2011).
Shifting to a more political economy based macro-perspective, Europeanisation is often discussed in terms of internationalisation and globalisation, considering to what extent they are interrelated dynamics (Mann 1998; Nederveen 1999; Rosamond 1999; Meyer 2001; Katzenstein 2005; Beckfield 2006; Kriesi 2008). According to Katzenstein (2005, 13), internationalisation is ‘a process that refers to territorially based exchanges across borders. It refers to basic continuities in the evolution of the international state system; and globalisation [is] a process that transcends space and compresses time. It has novel transformative effects on world politics’. Overall, globalisation and internationalisation are not the intentional outcomes of political actions. In contrast, Europeanisation is understood as the target of much of the EU’s policy-making, as long as EU politics has purposes. Whether these purposes are successfully accomplished is actually what is at stake.

From a global point of view, the expansion of international flows through new networks of information and communication technologies in Europe has contributed significantly to the global economy (Castells 2008, 81; see also Raab 2008). Castells (2008) describes how the structures of global networks affect everyone and anything because all core cultural and communicative activities are globalised. Similar to Wallace’s (2000) argument that the EU is ‘a regional variant of globalization’, he further states that European integration can be considered as both a reaction to the global process and also the most advanced expression of it (Castells 2000, 348). In a different style, but with a similar message, Fligstein and Mérand provocatively argue that ‘much of what people call ‘globalisation’ in Europe is in fact Europeanisation’ (Fligstein and Mérand 2002, 8). Trade and investments are not happening independent of the nation state and part of what we mean by globalisation needs therefore to be recast. According to Fligstein and Mérand’s argument, globalisation is not a force beyond the control of governments; rather, global and regional markets have been purposively created by facilitating rules, competition policies and – in the case of the EU – a single currency.

Mainstream European studies literatures have tended to treat globalisation as external to the process of integration and Europeanisation of governance function. According to Rosamond (1999), globalisation is still a contested phenomenon within the EU, but could actually help legitimate the EU’s intervention in some policy areas. Following this line of thought, Nederveen (1999) states that the relationship between Europeanisation and globalisation is crucial to answer where Europe is heading, especially in relation to the EU’s cultural complexity. If the EU also wants to be the travelling light for matters of culture and a common identity, then this means an ‘open Europe’ and a less exclusive Union, in the sense of a redefinition of citizenship and immigration laws (ibid., 15; Ugur 1995).

The EU may lead to new forms of inequality and exclusion, however. Some literature certainly, following Bauman (2000a), insists upon the stratifying effects of mobility, free movement and cross-national integration at the macro-regional level (Weiß 2005; Kofman 2005; Delhey and Kohler 2006; Berger and Weiß 2008). Rumford (2001; 2002; 2003) questions to what extent the EU controls and shapes all the processes taking place within its sphere of influence. He points out that a plurality of European public and social spaces exists, but often beyond the control or unrelated to the EU and its member states.
European social spaces are not necessarily constituted by European integration. Rumford further criticises the abuse of the notion of civil society as the dominant way of understanding the relationship between European integration and European society under the conditions of globalisation (see also Hansen 2002). In a similarly critical study of how the EU is drawn into a wider discussion of politics among the general public, White (2010a and 2010b) concludes from his conversations with taxi-drivers that though the EU and national institutions are equally mentioned as having difficulties in addressing substantive concerns of its citizens, this is particularly problematic for the EU. Unlike the EU, a traditional polity can draw on additional sources like ties generated by common culture and history (White 2010a, 1036). This will be a vital point in understanding and defining Europeanisation from below. As the EU still suffers from problems of legitimacy and a democratic deficit, it is important to distinguish between the intention and the outcome of Europeanisation. In the everyday lives of European citizens, the outcome of EU policies of free movement could as well be interpreted as a mere internationalisation of individual possibilities. The success of top-down Europeanisation is a core concern in the EU studies literature, not least to understand the relationship between citizens and the political authority given by the EU (Bellamy 2006). Kohler-Koch (2003) calls EU governance a multifaceted interconnectedness of EU and national governance, embracing a ‘communicative universe’ and a European public space. However, the distinction between EU governance and European governance deserves closer scrutiny. According to Walter (2005), the EU is not Europe per se, but only the most recent political unit to speak in behalf of Europe. Walter, however, specifies that we need to call attention to the plurality of Europes, pointing not to an Europeanisation of governance, but to a governmentalisation of Europe.

As the discussion above suggests, the question of Europeanisation quickly leads, via the issue of how to characterise the politics and governance of the EU, to bigger questions about how traditional conceptions of state, nation and community must be recast. Though Howe (1995) wrote in the early years of the new Union that cultural homogeneity is not a preliminary requisite for a political community but could be created despite the rich mosaic of languages, customs and traditions, there is today a more or less common resolution that we need new understandings of society, membership and belonging in order to comprehend the effects of European integration (Kostalopoulou 1997).

EU citizenship has been a core subject for grasping the changing interrelation between individuals, the nation state and European integration since the Maastricht Treaty (Habermas 1992; Eder 2001; Faist 2001; Bellamy 2004; Maas 2007). Union citizenship challenges the predominant notion that national citizenship is imperative to membership in a polity – it is anchored in a deterritorialised notion of persons’ rights regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community (Soysal 1994). To understand citizenship in the EU context, old concepts of belonging and membership must be re-worked (Wiener 1998). According to Delanty (2000) the discourse on citizenship has been fragmented into separated discourses of rights, participation, responsibility and identity. Guild (1999) points to the fact that constructing an identity on the basis of European citizenship is problematic since the distinction between full members and non-members in practice is far from clear.
The need for a theoretical and methodological shift is brought to the table not only by the European integration and Europeanisation literature, but also by globalisation theories (Bauman 2000a and 2000b; Cohen and Kennedy 2000). Globalisation has a transformative impact and is affecting everyday lives and traditional ways of living. It alters nation states and their modes of relating to each other. ‘It is the way we now live’, Giddens notes (2002, 19). However, though globalisation is best understood as ‘denationalisation’ (Zürn 2000), states still retain and activate the capabilities which enable the global system to function (Sassen 2006).

Nation states remain the key units of analysis in much of the empirical comparative-historical sociology of Europe (for example, the welfare state literature, which barely even notices the EU: Esping-Anderson 1999). An exception is Kaelble’s (1987; 1990; 2004; 2007) research on the long-term differences and commonalities of European societies. Kaelble’s account looks at Europeanisation via the convergence of spheres of social and public life, such as education, the welfare state, gender and class. As with all major comparative works, the EU stays in the background, although it may be a consequence of some of these dynamics. What created this historically unique unification of European states is part of a process that Crouch (1999) calls the ‘mid-century social compromise’ where industrialism, capitalism, liberalism and citizenship achieved a distinctive balance in Western European politics. However, Crouch’s work is rooted in the comparative welfare state literature and does not tackle the question of the EU’s transformative effects in this context (see also Therborn 1995; Mendras 1997).

A new generation of empirical sociology has more recently focused on understanding how the EU and European integration impact on daily life (for a review, see Favell and Guiraudon 2011). It investigates the degree of Europeanisation on an everyday level and the forms by which the EU has projected its power on society. For instance, Díez Medrano (2010a) points to how ‘nationals’ have become ‘Europeans’ at the level of consumer lifestyle. In both French and German, the term ‘Europeanisation’ is more routinely applied in the broader, sociological, and EU-specific sense we endorse, such as in Bach (2000), which addresses the issue of the Europeanisation of domestic societies, or Mau and Verwiebe, who refer to ‘horizontal Europeanisation’, which they describe as ‘contacts, interactions and social relations across different European countries as well as forms of pan-European mobility’ (2009, 270, original text in German). Another indicator of Europeanisation is the proliferation of transnational networks of claims-making on an EU-wide scale (Imig and Tarrow 2001), or the willingness of EU citizens to see certain policies dealt with at the EU level. A useful, comprehensive framing of the issues is also made by Díez Medrano (2008), who assesses the ways in which Europeanisation might be said to be leading to a fully-fledged European society, parallel to the ways that historical nation-building led to national societies. His assessment is largely negative. Bach (2006) observes that society – meant as an overlap of the nation state – vanishes as a unit of reference for social integration, and that sociology must bring new concepts to cope with it in an age of supra-national integration and governance. Schissler and Soysal (2005) take another perspective and examine the role of changing school curricula in the global era. Since a great part of nation-state building historically has been based on schooling, they
expect a new framing of education as the nation today is being ‘reborn’ in a European context.

As both sociologists and anthropologists emphasise, there has thus been a need to advance research on European integration beyond political science literature and perhaps to reshape the notion of ‘Europeanisation’ for their own purposes. Anthropologists were first in this respect, coming from a discipline that has some core traditions valuable for the study of Europeanisation from below (MacDonald 1993; see also Abélès 1996; Borneman and Fowler 1997), though Shore in the beginning of the 1990s called for anthropology to acknowledge the activities of the EC ‘above’ (Shore and Black 1992). Shore found that in the shift towards a new global paradigm at the level of theory, anthropology remained regrettably wedded to the local-level experience not taking the EC into account. Later Shore (1993; 1997; 2000) has produced valuable pieces on European cultural policies. Similarly, work on different aspects of the EU transnationalism has brought important contributions for our research. Instead of analysing the EU as a political system, Delhey (2004) views it as a social space of non-state actors of different nationality. Focusing on transnational social integration, he calls for an analytical shift from convergence to interrelations among member countries. Delanty (1998) suggests focusing on ‘transformation’, which evokes less ‘the end of the social’ and more the emerging ‘network society’ based on knowledge. On the basis of Favell’s (2003 and 2008a) research on mobile Europeans, Favell and Guiraudon (2009 and 2011) remark that any data-driven empirical project should extend the concept of Europeanisation parallel to the notion of globalisation, thus framing it as a macro-regional scale process revolving around a political project, the European Union.

Recently, a number of sociological works have advanced the agenda of the Europeanisation vs. internationalisation of social practices and identifications, as well as the variation that might be found according to national, cultural, age, gender, social class or migrant-origin backgrounds. Much of this work takes off from the original transactional paradigm of Deutsch and colleagues (1957), who held that the best indicator of regional integration was the volume and intensity of cross-border connections – of both elites and ordinary citizens. Perhaps the broadest of these updates of Deutsch has been Fligstein’s Euroclash (2008). Fligstein pulls together all the available secondary sources for the study of Europeanised practices, values and identifications, concluding that the Europe-in-the-making is polarised between a small, elite minority who has substantially Europeanised its networks, self-understandings, and political goals, and a large minority who feels shut out from these benefits. Half-way between these two poles stands the largest group of middle-class, highly nationalised Europeans, who sometimes see benefits in the European project and sometimes not. Fligstein usefully breaks with the mechanistic Deutschian view about transactionalism, by stressing via Bourdieu-inspired logic how elite, highly Europeanised networks are in effect creating a non-spatial ‘social field’ that is characterised by new forms of cultural capital and social identities specific to the European space.

The work of Díez Medrano (2008) similarly concludes that a more embracing European society is a distant prospect. However, on the different measures of Europeanisation that he constructs, it can be seen that Europeanising practices are taking hold in the mundane
everyday lives of Europeans – in terms of intermarriage, business networks, consumer practices, and so on. Moreover, even as this relatively benefits the upper classes of Europe, the groups for whom the impact of such Europeanisation has brought the biggest change have been less educated populations, who now travel or holiday in Europe to a much larger degree than they used to. Understandings and identifications of Europe, however, remain determined largely by national-level ‘framings’ of European integration (Díez Medrano 2003), that differ widely across the continent and are not appreciably changed either by EU information campaigns and symbols, or by the degree of international experience of these citizens.

**European identity**

Research on European identity has been a ‘growth industry’ in EU studies for well over a decade (for a recent review, see Kaina and Karolewski 2009). This has been visible in the publication of numerous edited volumes on the topic, including both conceptual (e.g. Wintle 1996; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009) as well as case study approaches (e.g. Robyn 2005; Sjursen 2006). Survey based analysis of the subject from within EU studies was first pioneered by Gabel (1998). A further key empirical contribution, based on quantitative and qualitative studies, was edited by Herrmann and colleagues (2004). A complete review and analysis of concepts of and data on European identity and a European public sphere has been recently provided by Risse (2010), discussing both aspects in the light of European politics.

Moreover, European identity is the subject of many comprehensive articles discussing the necessity (Kaina 2006), possible conceptualisations and operationalisations (Delanty 2002; Sinnott 2005), as well as the empirical existence of a European identity (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Kohli 2000; Citrin and Sides 2004; Nissen 2006; Roose 2007). Not only have political scientists and sociologists occupied themselves with the topic, but scholars from various disciplines, such as geographers (e.g. Keith and Pile 1993), anthropologists (e.g. McDonald 1993) and historians (e.g. Mikkely 1998; Loth 2002; Koops 2002).

**Conceptualising European identity**

Identity is a notoriously unsatisfactory concept in the social sciences (Abdelal et al. 2009; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The very notion of European identity has therefore attracted a lot of scepticism (Favell 2005). Criticism targets both the conceptual (i.e. Strath 2002) and methodological aspects of identity. It therefore needs careful unpacking and operationalisation in any new research to be of value.

There is agreement in the literature that collective identity entails an individualistic and a collectivistic part (Kohli 2000; Smith 1992; Kantner 2006). We align ourselves with literature that adopts a bottom-up approach to collective identification, and prefer to speak of active individual identification rather than group identity attribution. Along with Tajfel (1974 and 1981), we distinguish among three dimensions of collective identity: cognitive, evaluative and affective orientations (see also Citrin et al. 2001). On a cognitive
level, individuals need to perceive themselves as members of a certain group. In the European context, people need to categorise themselves as European. On an evaluative level, collective identities rest upon a set of beliefs with respect to the criteria of inclusion or exclusion to a group. These two dimensions form a necessary condition for the development of a third dimension of identity: an affective relationship to the collective in the form of a certain feeling of attachment or belonging.

We contend that each of these dimensions ought to be analysed when studying European identity. Mainly due to data restrictions, many quantitative survey analyses of European identity rely on the affective dimension only. While the related item in Eurobarometer (‘please tell me how attached you feel – very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not at all attached’) has been shown to be the most reliable operationalisation of European identity (Sinnott 2005), it only captures one of three dimensions of collective identity. Moreover, the emphasis on the affective dimension might ignore more sober, implicit instances of European identity (Cram 2012). In contrast, focusing on the cognitive dimension only (in the form of self-categorisation) bears the risk of capturing ‘role playing’ rather than identity proper (Risse 2010, 35). In other words, to identify with a collectivity means not only to categorise oneself as member of a group but to internalise the norms and rules of that group, and to ascribe an affective relationship to it. Finally, ignoring the cognitive dimension bears the risk of grasping something else than identification. For example, a third-country immigrant might well have lived long enough in Europe to feel attached to it and to have internalised its norms and values, but might still not consider herself as European. Thus, our aim will be to unpack the abstract concept of identification into different cognitive, evaluative and affective dimensions.

Additionally, collective identity has different components, referring to different aspects of the community. Bruter (2004a and 2004b) has distinguished a civic and a cultural component of European identity. The civic component highlights citizenship, democracy and rule of law. People holding a civic European identity identify with the European Union as a political entity. The cultural component of European identity, on the other hand, refers to a (perceived) cultural closeness to other Europeans and rests upon a common history and cultural heritage. People with a cultural European identity view Europe as a cultural community (Bruter 2004a, 196). In addition, Schlenker (2011) identifies ethnic elements of European identity, relating to issues such as European common ancestry. In a similar vein, Risse (2010) argues that two different narratives of European identity exist, a ‘modern’ one stressing enlightenment, human rights and democracy, and a ‘nationalist’ one emphasising ‘Fortress Europe’ and evoking ethnic features. In fact, identity constructions are known to have effects of closure and exclusion on ‘others’ against whom a positive self-identity is being imagined (Mouffe 2000; Mummendey and Waldzus 2004). Thus, the building of a European identity, however benevolently termed, can easily degrade into the exclusion of visibly distinct populations, who are deemed to not fit the idealised European mould or who are not yet part of the ‘club’, tacitly continuing to see Europe as a West European project (Holmes 2000; Case 2008). We will thus develop and test a multidimensional operationalisation of identifications that distinguishes their nature (cognitive, evaluative or affective) and focus (cultural or political).
It is also important to note that although European identification and support to European integration are often related in the minds of ordinary citizens (and in practice difficult to disentangle at the measurement level), they are conceptually different (Duchesne and Frognier 2002; Bruter 2005; Grundy and Jamieson 2007; Antonsich 2008; Díez Medrano 2010b).

Scholars in social psychology contend that people can hold multiple collective identities (Erikson 1956; Lawler 1992). Strong national or local identifications are thus not necessarily an obstacle to European identity (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Westle 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004; Bruter 2005). As long as different group memberships are culturally and institutionally constructed as nested rather than as mutually exclusive, Europeans are generally able to add a European dimension to their conception of who they are, in comfortable coexistence with their national and local identifications. In fact, in some studies, strong national identities have been found to have a positive effect on European identity (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Fuchs et al. 2009). This seems to support Risse’s (2004) argument that, at least in some countries, European identity is framed as the extension of national identity. When attribution of legitimate political responsibility for government action, or perception of winners and losers of European integration is put to the test, however, identifications quickly become conflictual. Consequently, exclusive national identities and perceived threat by immigration have been routinely found to be a source of eurosceptic attitudes (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Luedtke 2005; McLaren 2006).

European identity has been studied from various methodological angles – each of which has its strong and weak points. Quantitative survey analysis highlights identity patterns. Yet, it bears the risk that ‘one forces opinions to be expressed on highly abstract matters which respondents have rarely engaged with, and infers attitudes and beliefs which have barely formed’ (White 2009, 699). Moreover, quantitative surveys do not allow accounting for the contextuality of collective identities. This task is better achieved using focus groups (Bruter 2004b; Duchesne 2010) and qualitative interviews (White 2009; Díez Medrano 2010b) which are useful to study ‘identity in use’ and to shed light on how people interpret European identity. Research relying on laboratory experiments (Bruter 2003; Cram et al. 2011) is very useful to isolate causal relations. However, both qualitative research and experiments provide findings of limited generalisability (Castano 2004). Thus, in our research project we will employ methodological pluralism rather than relying on one research method.

**Predictors of European identification**

When assessing the effects leading to European identifications among ordinary citizens, it makes sense to differentiate between factors at the individual and at the macro level. We will first discuss individual-level predictors and then turn to the macro level.

European identifications are particularly expected to be found among intra-European migrants (Favell 2008a; Recchi and Favell 2009; Roeder 2011) and people frequently engaged in cross-border mobility and contacts (Fligstein 2008; Gustafson 2009; Kuhn
2011). They experience everyday life in another EU country and thus are able to refer to three different dimensions of identification such as their home society, their host society and Europe (Recchi and Nebe 2003).

Permanent as well as temporary intra-EU movers have been the focus of research on European identifications. Among them are specific groups such as retirement migrants (O’Reilly 2007) or students (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003; Sigalas 2010; Wilson 2011), whose opportunities to go abroad have increased during the European integration process. Although Mau and Büttner (2010) find that an increasing ‘horizontal’ Europeanisation enabled by a ‘vertical’ Europeanisation has a positive effect on citizens’ European identification, Díez Medrano (2008) also makes clear that the growth of opportunities for cross-border mobility and communication is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the rise in the numbers of self-identified Europeans. After all, only a minority of Europeans engages in stable cross-border interactions (Fligstein 2008). Moreover, even those Europeans that regularly interact cross-nationally do not necessarily come to identify as European and with the European Union. A number of processes may contribute to this. First, as suggested by conflict theory (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967), the confrontation with the foreign ‘other’ might reinforce national identities, especially if this foreign ‘other’ is also European. Such encounters with fellow Europeans, as opposed to encounters with non-Europeans outside of Europe’s geographical space, may activate people’s need for differentiation (Brewer and Yuki 2007). Second, highly transnational individuals might perceive their cross-border practices as primarily bi-national and they might thus develop a bi-national or regional rather than European identification (Rother and Nebe 2009). This could especially be the case for interactions between two countries that encourage cross-border exchanges with an eye to strengthening ‘regional’ integration (e.g., Denmark and Sweden). Third, utilitarian considerations may enter the process, thus cancelling out and distorting the impact of cross-border interactions. ‘Winners’ and ‘losers’ of Europeanisation may frame cross-border interaction differently, the former as cultural enrichment and the latter as incursions in enemy territory. Fourth, transnational contacts may foster a sense of cosmopolitanism more than or instead of European identification (Pichler 2008).

What is evident from all available sources, education is a strong predictor of European identification. There are several potential reasons why more highly educated people are more prone to feel European. First, in line with Inglehart’s (1970) concept of cognitive mobilisation, a higher level of education increases one’s ability to grasp abstract and complex issues and to gain ‘the skills necessary to cope with an extensive political community’ (ibid., 47). Second, people might ‘learn’ to identify with Europe by being exposed to pro-European and cosmopolitan ideals, especially so in higher education (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). Finally, a high level of education provides better life chances and increases the likelihood to belong to the ‘winners’ of European integration (Kriesi et al. 2008). Given that identity and interests are strongly intertwined (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Kohli 2000), highly educated people might endorse a European identity due to utilitarian benefits. This last perspective is supported by the fact that also socio-economic privilege (i.e., occupational status and income) is highly correlated with European identity (Citrin and Sides 2004).
Younger people have consistently been found to be more inclined to identify with Europe (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Citrin and Sides 2004; Fligstein 2008). Similar patterns of more widespread supranational identifications among younger people were also found in other regions of the world (Norris 2000; Roose 2010). While it might be tempting to expect European identity to become more mainstream with each new cohort, Jung’s (2008) research shows that the higher propensity of supranational identities among the young is likely to be a life course rather than a cohort effect.

Finally, certain aspects of people’s belief systems have been shown to correlate with European identity. In general, people further to the left on the political spectrum are more likely to hold a European identity (Citrin and Sides 2004; Green 2007; Risse 2010), but there are some exceptions to this pattern (Duchesne and Frognier 1995). Moreover, people subscribing to cosmopolitan ideals tend to identify with Europe as well (Pichler 2009b). However, Schlenker (2011) argues that it matters what kind of European identity people have: while she found a positive correlation between cosmopolitanism and civic European identity, cosmopolitanism correlates negatively with ethnic elements of European identity.

Most authors agree that collective identities are socially constructed rather than previously given (Kohli 2000; Risse 2010). They can evolve in consequence to structural changes. There are several ways in which institutions are deemed to influence collective identity formation. First, institutions socialise the people subjected to them and can ultimately influence their collective identities (Checkel 2007). According to this argument, the longer a country is already in the EU – and the longer its citizens have been exposed to European institutions, their values and norms – the more widespread is European identity expected to be. Risse (2010, 91) does indeed find empirical support for this claim. However, Roose (2010) compares the pattern and extent of European identity to supranational identities in other (less integrated) regions of the world and finds that the gradual shift towards supranational identifications in Europe is no exception. He thus concludes that European identity cannot be explained by European institution building alone. Equally, in a panel study among officials of the European Commission, Hooghe (2005) finds little support for the hypothesis that socialisation in the Commission over time increases support for the norms of this institutions.

Institutions can shape identities even more actively through ‘persuasion’ (Risse 2010) by employing narratives and symbols which strengthen the psychological existence of the EU (Castano 2004) and promote group identity. In this respect, national educational systems play a key role. For instance, the French educational system has been shown to be a strong driver of French nation building in the 19th century (Weber 1976). European member states vary considerably in the extent to which they put European Union on their educational agenda (Haus 2009). To varying degrees, member states have adjusted history textbooks (Schissler and Soysal 2005), national narratives and civic education (Hinderliter Ortloff 2005) to European integration and globalisation. These national differences are likely to influence the degree to which citizens adopt a European identity.

Equally, the exposure to European symbols, such as the flag of the European Union, Euro coins or the European anthem, is expected to promote European identification among
the public by increasing the visibility of the ‘imagined community’ of the EU (Bruter 2003). Using experiments, Bruter finds that the recurrent exposure to symbols of European integration reinforces citizens’ cultural identification with Europe. While relating to EU support rather than identity proper, Cram et al.’s (2011) online experiments among English, Irish and Scottish citizens provide mixed evidence: the exposure to the European flag has no impact on EU attitudes, while the exposure to functional triggers such as the European passport polarises existing opinion.

Moreover, public discourse plays a crucial role in creating a common European identity (Risse 2010). Put differently, the generally low levels of European identification among the mass public have often been imputed to the weak development of a European public sphere (for an opposing view, see Koopmans et al. 2010). After all, collective identities being processual, they need to be constructed and negotiated (Kaelble 2009, 207). Indeed, in countries with a higher visibility of European topics in mass media, people tend to identify more with Europe (Stoeckel 2008). Not only the quantity but also the content of media coverage is crucial. Bruter (2003) finds that persistent good news strengthens European identity, while continuous bad reporting on Europe weakens it. Moreover, elites play a direct role in European identity formation. A Spanish inquiry on the diffusion of attitudes – somewhat reminiscent of a classic study (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955) – shows that pro-European individuals, being on average more educated, are more likely than the rest of the population to spread their views through social networks (Garcia Faroldi 2008). Political leaders’ influence has also been tested. Both positive party positions on European integration and a greater salience of European topics in party agendas imbue a stronger sense of European identity among the public. Referring to EU support rather than EU identity, the literature on cue-taking testifies of a strong link between party positions and public opinion (Hooghe 2007; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Hobolt 2009).

**Cross-border practices**

In the wake of the emerging globalisation of the economy and increasing population and communication flows, anthropologists introduced the concept of ‘transnationalism’ to give a new twist to migration research in the early 1990s. In their own words, the concept was meant to denote ‘the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement’ (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992, 1), those ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states’ (Vertovec 1999, 447), or ‘activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation’ (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999, 210). Very rapidly, many social scientists elaborated on the concept, claiming that it could equally cope with individual and collective units of analysis, with economic, cultural and political actions, as well with factual and attitudinal contents (i.e., behaviours and orientations). However, no clear-cut (albeit conventional) cutting points for the duration, intensity and scope of cross-border behaviours and/or orientations to qualify them as ‘transnational’ have ever been firmly established. This is perhaps one of the reasons why, at the end of the day, the theoretical debate on transnationalism has grown much larger than the empirical literature on it –
especially in Europe (Fibbi and D’Amato 2008, 7). But even when field research adopts this framework, there is a tendency to blur ‘acting’ and ‘feeling’ transnational. As is often the case, the success of the term has turned it into an umbrella for differing phenomena. In the best of cases, ‘transnationalism’ is endangered of conceptual over-stretching; in the worst, of becoming a journalistic catch-all cliché of the contemporary migrant experience.

To avoid potential confusions, in our project we prefer to use the concept of ‘cross-border practices’ as a more concrete label for individual activities spanning over different national contexts. This terminological option has another advantage. In contemporary social science, ‘transnationalism’ is predominantly associated to migrants – or, more precisely, to a sub-set of them sometime called ‘transmigrants’ (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1995). In fact, in an age of globalisation, the opportunities of contact with individual and corporate actors established abroad have grown exponentially for everybody. Thus, when speaking of ‘cross-border practices’, we intend to focus on behaviours that are performed by any possible individual agent in any aspect of everyday life. Moreover, we are interested in studying such practices ‘from below’ focusing on the internationalisation of mundane social activities.

Much before transnationalism had become en vogue, the idea that cross-border practices were key drivers of social change was enshrined in Karl Deutsch’s transactionalist theory (Deutsch et al. 1957). The theory itself was crafted to account for processes of international integration, having in mind the then embryonic European construction as a ‘security community’. In Deutsch’s view, the institutionalisation of such a ‘community’ depends on the scope and strength of a wide palette of cross-border exchanges – such as international trade, labour and capital mobility, scientific cooperation, cultural activities, the use of non-national media and intermarriages (cf. in particular Deutsch 1954, 145; Deutsch 1969, 102). Quite imaginatively, Deutsch (1954) mentioned the ratio between domestic and international mail as a possible indicator of cross-border interactions. This operational hint is even more suggestive in a time of generalised use of electronic mail. Broadly speaking, any transaction across borders would foster a learning process supporting trust in the emerging supra-national polity and a virtuous circle of additional support for further integration (Adler and Barnett 1998).

Physical mobility across borders

Of all possible cross-border experiences, few are likely to be more absorbing and emotionally charged than resettling abroad. Hence, international migration among EU member states has been the form of cross-border practice that has so far attracted the largest scholarly interest. Recent trends in intra-EU mobility, of course, build on a long history of such movements in the modern period (Bade 2000; Moch 2003). But the establishment of a globally unique free movement regime – meant to make the crossing of national borders as easy as possible under the aegis of a common citizenship (Maas 2007; Koikkalainen 2011) – has made this practice even more topical in the EU context.
Following on the abundant legal literature on the free movement regime (for overviews, Magnette 1999, Baldoni 2003; Koslowski 2004; Guild 2009, 132 ff.), as well as earlier descriptive studies of intra-EU migrations (Salt and Schmidt 2001), the most encompassing sociological study of the population of EU mobile citizens remains the PIONEUR project (funded under the EC 5th framework program), which is based on a comparative survey of 5000 such citizens within Western Europe (Recchi and Favell 2009). This study highlights the selectivity of intra-EU movers from the former EU-15 in terms of socioeconomic status and the relative marginality of labour migrants among them – with the exception of the older cohorts of guest-workers in Germany (Braun and Recchi 2009). As other research confirms (e.g., Verwiebe 2011 on Europeans in Berlin), purely economic motives are not the paramount spurs of intra-EU migration. Moreover, PIONEUR data reveal the inclination of intra-EU movers to sew international friendship networks and embark onto further geographical mobility over their lifecourse (Alaminos and Santacreu 2009). Another relevant finding is that while individual-level differences are considerable in many regards (e.g., motives of mobility, education and class background, age at migration), movers’ strategies of integration in host societies are to a large extent independent from country-level variations – that is, they are de-nationalised, being focused on neither the country of origin nor the country of residence of the movers (Braun and Glöckner-Rist 2011). Particularly when it comes to language proficiency – which is often pointed at as the major hurdle to mobility in Europe – ‘Europeans are Europeans, rather than Germans, Italians, etc., in the way they adapt to other national contexts in Europe’ (Braun 2010, 615). Finally, the subjective correlates of cross-border movements are clear: EU movers have an acute sense of being European, as they identify more strongly with ‘Europe’ and have by far a more positive image and better knowledge of the European Union than the rest of the population (Rother and Nebe 2009; for a local study with similar outcomes, see Block 2004). The latter finding has been corroborated by additional analyses of the European Social Survey, showing that immigrants from new member states and third-country citizens are also more positively oriented to European integration (Roeder 2011).

Complementing its political stake on citizenship and free movement, the EU itself has directly conducted research on cross-border mobility, mainly via the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions. The Dublin-based institution has promoted an ad hoc Eurobarometer survey tapping intentions to move to other member states and accession countries in 2002 and replicated it, with extra-questions on mobility experiences, in 2005. Predictions of East-West migration after enlargements based on the 2002 survey proved to be extremely conservative in terms of volume (no more than 1.3 million persons in five years) and inaccurate in terms of destinations of potential migrants (two thirds of the sample said they aimed for Germany and less than 5% mentioned the UK and Italy) (Krieger 2004). In 2005, expectations of mobility had grown: 5.4% of the working-age EU citizens interviewed by Eurobarometer said they thought of moving to another EU member state in the following five years (Fouarge and Ester 2007). In retrospect, however, the whole exercise of assessing ‘migration projects’ seems rather disconnected from ‘migration facts’. Intentions to move turn out to be poor estimations of actual movements. More reliable are perhaps data,
taken from the same 2005 Eurobarometer, tracking past episodes of geographical mobility in the EU-25. These data indicate that EU citizens who had ever lived in another EU member state amounted to 4% of the population. At the time, Eastern Europeans were far less likely than their Western neighbours to have had such an experience. Consistently with the findings from PIONEUR, the probabilities of cross-border residence diminished among less educated respondents (Vandenbrande et al. 2006). Finally, the European Foundation carried out an econometric analysis of the same Eurobarometer wave seeking to assess the economic and psychological outcomes of cross-country relocations (Birindelli and Rustichelli 2007). This study charted a complex scenario, in which macro- and micro-level findings tell different stories (see also Hadler 2006 with similar results). At the macro-level, higher proportions of movers from other EU countries were found in areas with better labour market performances. At the micro-level, however, ‘movers within the EU [were], on average, characterised by poor labour market indicators’ (Birindelli and Rustichelli 2007, 30). The benefits of cross-border mobility were hardly discernible in purely economic terms. These concerns have also been at the heart of the EU’s Sapir report which looked at mobility and flexibility on the European market as a key dimension of European economic growth (Aghion et al. 1994).

Another large-scale data-set on mobile European workers was collected by a multi-disciplinary research project on ‘Job Mobilities and Family Lives in Europe. Modern Mobile Living and its Relation to Quality of Life’, which in 2007 conducted a survey in Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Switzerland (Schneider and Meil 2008). In all these countries, workers with some experience of such mobility – with differing forms and intensity – are found to amount to about half of the samples of people aged 25 to 54. Again, country-level differences are much lower than individual-level ones – in particular gender and age (young men are over-represented among movers). Moreover, consistently with what emerged from PIONEUR (Recchi 2009), job-related spatial mobility is hardly a factor of social upward mobility but rather a strategy to buffer potential downward shifts in class positions (Meil 2008, 313). Another key finding of this study is that mobility can be unpacked into many different variants in terms of residential choices, distance, duration and regularity. As ideal-types, mobile individuals are distinguished into the ‘residentially relocated’ and the ‘recurrently mobile’; the latter group further subdivides into ‘shuttlers’, ‘long-distance commuters’, ‘overnighters’, ‘job nomads’ and the ‘vari-mobiles’ (Limmer and Schneider 2008).

Around these huge survey-based studies revolves a galaxy of more focused, mostly qualitative, inquiries exploring either specific locations or subsets of movers. One such work is Favell’s (2008a) Eurostars and Eurocities, whose ethnographic materials illustrate the variety and subtleties of mobility choices of the post-Maastricht generation of young and well-educated EU citizens who settled in major cities – such as London, Amsterdam and Brussels. While being clearly exceptional, even within the whole population of movers (cf. Favell and Recchi 2011), the ‘Eurostars’ stand out as prototypes of a European-style creative class embodying the human type that better suits the kind of economic and cultural opportunities carved out by European integration. Similar work was also done on movers settled in Berlin by Verwiebe (2004; see also the pioneering work by Tarrius 1992 and 2000).
Focusing on the new waves of intra-EU migration spurred by the enlargements of the Union in 2004 and 2007, Favell (2008b) argues that survey-based research must be complemented by a focus on the ‘human face’ of this migration through ethnographic level investigations of experiences, networks and practices. Such a methodological option helps go beyond outdated views of migration. As also King (2002) points out, European migrants are not only poor manual workers bound to a Gastarbeiter destiny. Even when originating from non-(yet) EU countries, many of them belong to an ‘emergent migrant middle class’, as Verwiebe (2008 and 2011) calls it in his study of Western and Eastern (pre-enlargement) Europeans working in Berlin. New forms of migration derive from a large canvas of macro- and micro-level conditions (Koser and Lutz 1998; Favell 2009). Furthermore the binary opposition of ‘home’ and ‘host’ countries need be overcome, as migration today is part of a much more extensive system of mobilities. A good example of this novel migration thinking is Burrell’s (2006) inquiry of Polish, Italian and Greek-Cypriot immigrants in Leicester. Her work is structured around narratives of migration, national identities, transnational networks and community life. Emphasis is placed on migrants as active agents in the migration process. With this approach we move away from the dominant focus on immigrants defined against a host country in ethnicised forms as collective units, showing a range of motivations and strategies that do not fit into standard labelling. Among the many local studies of the new migration facilitated by the EU enlargements of the 2000s (cf. Recchi and Triandafyllidou 2010), Metykove (2010) explores the implications of media practices for identity, belonging and political participation, highlighting migrants’ sophisticated skills in combining traditional and digital media. Sandu (2005) takes another look at East-West population movements and poses the question of whether Eastern Europeans are developing a type of ‘regional transnationalism’. He identifies a new migration structure in terms of communities and regions, outlining the role that Romanian villages play in conditioning the flows of transnational circular migration (see also Morawska 2002). Moreover, Sandu (2010a and 2010b) shows the clustering of cross-border practices formed by sending remittances home, communicating regularly with people in the home country and planning travels and resettlements. All these behaviours are combined to measure a composite ‘index of home orientation’, that – applied to a large sample of migrants in Spain – proves to be efficient in categorising the population at stake in terms of differing forms of transnationalism.

Another strand of research spearheaded by geographers deals with retirement and lifestyle migration – one of the most underestimated cross-border practices within Europe (for an overview, Benson and O’Reilly 2009). O’Reilly (2000) offers an ethnographic investigation of the way of life of the British on the Costa del Sol, looking at how national stereotypes work in this context. She concludes by stating that this is a ‘British’ movement in its own terms, in which Europe and even the host country are of marginal subjective importance among movers, who have brought traditional Britain to Spain and ‘gone home’. Further, O’Reilly (2007) calls this a ‘mobility-enclosure dialectic’. British lifestyle movers are victims of a whole range of contradictions: they move in sync with globalisation, they stay aloof from local societies and yet are frustrated of not being more integrated – at the end of the day, being unable to escape their Britishness. King, Warnes
and Williams (2000) similarly pioneered migration research on retirees in the South of Europe, mixing survey and qualitative work. Rodríguez et al. (1998) took a more mechanical approach to retirees in the Costa del Sol by researching the reasons, the stability of these reasons over time and the retiree population’s influence on the local economy and society. Gustafson (2001) carried out an interview-based study with Swedish retirees who spend summers in Sweden and winters in Spain, describing their experiences of mobility, their dual place attachment and the patchwork strategies for managing cultural diversities.

An analogous form of new migration particularly pertinent to the EU space is student migration (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003). Again, research on this topic challenges typical paradigm assumptions in the classical migration literature. Some research looks at the ‘Erasmus generation’, investigating to what extent EU-funded exchange programs reinforce or cause young students to become more pro-European (Blume 1998; Bettin Lattes and Bontempi 2008; Sigalas 2010; Wilson 2011). Evidence is mixed. Open-ended interviews and biographies emphasise the enduring transnational social capital and awareness of former Erasmus students, but more structured survey data falsify the hypothesis that the Erasmus experience by itself enhances support for European integration: Though there are significant differences between Erasmus and non-Erasmus students, the pro-Europeanness of Erasmus students has not changed after participating in the program (Wilson 2011).

Education is usually the empirical yardstick to define ‘high-skilled migration’ – a separate sub-field of international migration research which lends itself to a rather clichéd opposition of ‘elite’ and ‘ethnic’ migration (Favell 2003). Smith and Favell’s collection (2008) broadens the theoretical and methodological understanding of high-skilled migration, overcoming the false dichotomy between the educated corporate elites on the one hand and the desperate and poor labour migrant on the other. Similar insights can be gained by anthropological studies of expatriates in particular settings, such as Scott’s (2004) fieldwork on the British in Paris (see also Wagner 1998), that fine-tunes complex identity negotiations, or Zulauf’s (2001) research on migrant women professionals (i.e., nurses and bank employees) in Britain, Germany and Spain in the 1990s, that outlines the overlap of gender and nationality-based forms of discrimination even for skilled workers in a potentially migration-friendly legal environment. Ackers’ qualitative and policy-related studies have also focused on the problematic mobility of women, as well as on welfare rights for retirement migrants and the impact of the free movement regime on children (Ackers 1998; Ackers and Dwyer 2002; Ackers and Stalford 2004). A key message of her analysis is that this regime is porous and not uniformly applied – for instance, when it comes to educational systems and the recognition of qualifications. Paradoxically, it ‘serves to aggravate as much as facilitate family life’, especially when relationships break down and ‘the enforcement of divorce and parental responsibilities across member states become increasingly apparent’ (Ackers and Stalford 2004, 199). Relying on open-ended interviews to Polish and Bulgarian scientists in the UK and Germany, Ackers and Gill (2008) have also pioneered work on the causes and consequences of scientific mobility. Their study provides evidence of a high level of shuttle mobility, and therefore brain circulation seems to prevail over brain drain and brain gain. While some
respondents highlight the uneven marketability of academic credentials across borders, improvements in virtual communication for joint research and the networking and funding opportunities promoted by EU institutions in the R&D realm tend to make scientific mobility individually and collectively rewarding in the enlarged Europe.

Finally, some authors have taken a more critical stance on free movement, outlining its political significance with a stress either on its structure-based origin or its agency-centred nature. When the stress is on ‘structure’, cross-border mobility is framed as part of the ‘making [of] the European space’ as a homogenous and capital-friendly environment (Jensen and Richardson 2007, 141-142). These authors adopt a Foucaultian reading of free movement in which mobile people are passively shaped by EU governmentality. European policies fostering citizenship mobility are held to be part of a one-dimensional discourse of territory where the super-national political order and the remaking of everyday lived spaces intertwine, all the better to fuel a neo-liberal conception of the market dominant among policy-makers (Jensen and Richardson 2004). Such an approach, however, plays down entirely the strong agency involved in mobility choices. As mentioned above, in fact, several pieces of empirical research reveal that romance, adventure and quality of life motivate intra-EU migration even more than economic betterment. Due to convergence among member states, on purely economic grounds migration within Western Europe should have declined substantially in the last decades – but it did not (Recchi 2005 and 2008). Thus, taking to the extremes the agency component of free movement, Aradau et al. (2010) come to argue that European citizenship has created a tension between nationality and territoriality, and that it would be more fruitful to account for mobility across EU member state borders as a (possibly unconscious) political act of denationalised sociality.

Non-physical mobility across borders

What is clear from different sources is that the established distinction between movers and stayers is a rough approximation to the current reality of cross-border movements. Less permanent and more hybrid forms of border-crossing have been on the rise in the last decades: physical mobility such as transnational commuting, cross-border business and shopping, or split location lifestyles, and non-physical mobility such as the movement of money and savings, the consumption of international media, participation in virtual communities formed by people of different nationalities. Such an insight is also in tune with the social theoretical and human geography inspired literature on ‘mobilities’ that sees such networks, flows or discursive/media scapes as much as part of a mobile world as human bodies moving in time and space (Urry 2000 and 2007). Literature following this lead has in general accomplished to go beyond the narrow idea of free movement as a form of migration across borders, questioning the standard binary opposition of migration/mobility/movers to the local/locality/stayers (Büscher, Urry and Witchger 2010). ‘Mobilities’ refer to ‘not just movement but to this broader project of establishing a ‘movement-driven’ social science in which movement, potential movement and blocked movement, as well as voluntary/temporary immobilities, practices of dwelling and ‘nomadic’ place-making are all viewed as constitutive of economic, social and political
relations’ (ibid., 4). Urry identifies five forms of mobilities: corporeal travel of people; physical movement of objects to producers, consumers and retailers; the imaginative travel effected through talk, images and other visual media; virtual travel in real time that enables presence and action at a distance; communicative travel through person-person contact via embodied conduct, messages, texts, postcards, letters, telephones (Urry 2007, 47 ff.). Following a similar line, Elliott and Urry (2010) explore complex mobility systems and their transforming effect on everyday lives, on the basis of a few in-depth narratives that are, however, methodologically controversial as long as they are framed in a fiction-like format. Equally, Canzler, Kaufmann and Kesselring (2008) bring attention to the new concept of ‘motility’, which refers to the capacity of an actor to move socially and spatially and is therefore reinforced by networks. Kaufman (2008) also proposes to factor in ‘motility’ as a source of social change dependent on the speed potentials generated by technological transportation systems.

The empirical object from which Urry was inspired originally in his ‘mobility turn’ is tourism. In tune with Urry, Kaplan (2002) frames ‘travel’ as a polysemic act that can hardly be confined to tourism research. Even though tourism statistics force travels into motivational categories (e.g. Axhausen 2008), leisure and business are not always disconnected purposes of cross-border short-term movements. Moreover, while it is widely acknowledged that the expansion of travel experiences abroad is a paramount outcome of social change in the second half of the 20th century in industrial and post-industrial countries (Kaelble 2004; Axhausen 2005), even recent research on young people testifies that the aspiration and achievement of foreign holidays mirror social and cultural inequalities (Frändberg 2009). Overall, social science research on the amount, scope and subjective implications of travels within Europe is so far modest and unsystematic – if not for already quoted inquiries (Schneider and Meil 2008; Gustafson 2009) or for interpretations of travel statistics as indicators of Europeanisation (Fligstein 2008, 147 ff.; Mau 2010, 78 ff.).

Using a different conceptual language, Conradson and Latham (2005) discuss similar issues in terms of ‘transnational urbanism’ (Smith 2001) in an investigation attentive to the continuing significance of place and location. They focus on everyday practices inherent to transnational mobility in contrast to the naive tendency of both the mobilities literature and the famous social theory of Castells (2000) and Bauman (2000a and 2000b) that exaggerates the world as a borderless ‘space of flows’. These global visions glorify change, but not the everyday texture and the many things we take for granted in a mobile life. To extend the scope of transnational research, these authors shed light on what they call ‘middling’ forms of movements, referring to the implication of the middle class – and not only of elites and migrants from less developed countries – in transnational mobilities (ibid., 229; see also Smith 2005; Stüver 2005; Ehrkamp 2005; Rogers 2005; Yeoh 2005). More grounded research on transnationalism and mobilities is now emerging. For instance, Green (2002) explores how time and space are reconstructed through the use of mobile communication. Moving beyond the theoretical level and building on an ethnographic fieldwork, her research shows how mobile communication technologies mediate time in relation to mobile spaces. Grounded research also addresses the significance of different mobile practices. Amit-Talai (1997)
calls for anthropology to accept the loss of collectivity, though the question is posed whether anthropologists can deal with the effects of globalisation without taking away the intimacy and depth of its characteristically place-based work. Essentially he asks whether it is culture or social relations that are becoming more transnational (ibid., 321). Guarnizo and Smith (1998) conclude that transnationalism does not create a ‘third space’, being highly contextual; locality is therefore just as significant as the cross-border practice itself. Exactly against this change of boundaries is where anthropology should find its new backdrop (Stacul, Moutsou and Kopina 2007), expanding its scale to embrace Europe, not from the top-down perspective proposed by Shore (1997 and 2000), but rather from the bottom-up texture of actors composing identities with cosmopolitan, national, regional and local ‘bricks’. In an empirically grounded contribution on the cultural implications of mobility, Gustafson (2009) dismantles the uni-dimensionality of the well-established local-cosmopolitan dichotomy. His sample of Swedish frequent travellers turns out to endorse both cosmopolitanism and localism, suggesting to understand these concepts as distinct items rather than two poles of the same scale. Along similar lines, Nowicka’s (2005) study of international professionals shows that mobile people make their own spatial universe through daily practices and routines; hence place still matters though with different signatures than among the less mobile population.

As already discussed, physical mobility across state boundaries is possibly the most important but not the only cross-border practice that deserves closer scrutiny. In the internet age, social relations can be maintained across borders via multiple means of communication. International friendship networks and romance relationships are certainly part of the whole set of cross-border practices. Moreover, objects and events move through national boundaries, encapsulating thereafter consumers in cross-border practices. Thus, we complete this section by reviewing existing research on international friendship, long-distance relationships (and eventually their outcome, bi-national marriages) and international consumption patterns. We will then conclude with a final reflection on the special case of border regions.

The sociological study of friendship has greatly benefitted from the development of social network research. Inspired by a local study on past Erasmus students’ networks, De Federico de la Rúa (2002) hypothesises that international friends represent the micro-structural basis of supra-national identifications. Studying a small sample of architects working for multinational building companies, Kennedy (2004) reaches the same conclusion: under certain experiential conditions, viable friendship networks with people from different countries persist over time and into global life. These networks are also deemed to foster a post-national outlook. Similar issues arise when it comes to assess the effects of cross-border affective ties spanning over EU member states, although this research topic must not be confused with the more encompassing and more widely investigated area of interethnic partnerships. The only existing survey-based analyses of bi-national couples among EU movers indicate that the bulk of them decide to settle in one of the partner’s home country – ‘Eurostars’ being rather the exception to this rule (Braun and Recchi 2008; Gaspar 2011). On this definitely under-studied topic, which knows many possible variants (depending on residential choices, nationality combinations, legal status of the couple, family arrangements) an ambitious comparative
project, EUMARR, funded by the European Science Foundation and coordinated by Díez Medrano has been recently launched. This project is expected to deliver an accurate map of multinational families in Europe, as potential strong vectors of Europeanisation from below. Preliminary results of this project show that the single market and the Schengen space have had a negligible impact on bi-national marriages between Europeans in the countries under study (Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain). However, when many migrate in a rather stable way to another European country (e.g., Romanians to Spain), this is reflected in rapid increases in the number of bi-national couples. Díez Medrano’s project is currently exploring the individual variables that impact on a person’s choice to marry another European, with a focus on transnational cosmopolitan background, and the contrasts in lifestyles and identifications between members of bi-national couples and members of mono-national ones.

Lastly, borders are crossed virtually when social actors interact with objects that are imbued with foreign cultures – be it listening to music in another language, buying exotic food, or watching foreign media. A special concern with the modalities by which globalisation enters everyday lives through consumption patterns is the hallmark of the innovative empirical research completed by Savage et al. (2005). Their work is one of the few to put empirical flesh on the oft claimed idea that globalisation has dramatically transformed routine behaviours and attitudes. Their research explores how global changes are articulated locally in cultural practices, lifestyle and identities of the middle class. The local, however, is not an instance of the global and we should not be prompt to the dichotomising idea of local distinctiveness and global generalisation – what is important is the particularity of place. The idea of belonging, in response to both globalisation and the European integration process, has a profound role in the debates on time and space compression, citizenship and cultural distinctiveness. Burawoy’s Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections and Imaginations in a Postmodern World (2000) is a paradigmatic example of ‘grounded globalisation’ research. The goal is to grasp with matters such as the disappearance of the traditional workplace, the dispersion of enclaved communities and the fluidification of identity – all as part of how globalisation is experienced through everyday life.

This brings us to the seminal attempts by Mau (2010) to provide survey data for a multidimensional take on individual cross-border practices. Relying on an ad hoc survey of the German population, he draws a ‘cartography of transnational social relations’, which shows that almost half his respondents maintain social relations with at least a friend or a relative who lives abroad and that 60% of their holidays are spent in a different country. The critical question has to do with the effects of this transnationalisation of the life-worlds: Is there a connection between one’s integration in cross-border activities and the extent to which political and social orientations are detached from national identity? Do such activities truly create cosmopolitan citizens? Mau, Mewes and Zimmerman (2008) find that cross-country social experiences are not necessarily alienating people from their home locality, but rather work as a form of ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ that make them more aware of the role of international interconnectedness in everyday lives. Physical migration has been particular important for theories of transnationalism, but the citizens of economically advanced societies are
all potentially mobile and largely enmeshed in transnational social fields. These findings are partly corroborated by a study promoted by the European Commission (2011) on the emerging group of ‘New Europeans’ who have European-wide connections. More than half of all surveyed respondents still fit the pattern of ‘old Europeans’, i.e. their interactions and identifications remain at a national level. The ‘new Europeans’ in contrast, are engaged in cross-border interactions, due to either their migration background or links that they established throughout their lives. Personal ties to people from another European country were found to be the most prominent form of cross-border connectedness. ‘New Europeans’ are more likely to feel attached to a country other than their own than old Europeans, and they are more willing to move abroad. In contrast, their identification with Europe turns out to be only marginally stronger than among the group of ‘old Europeans’.

Cross-border relations are also fostered and sustained by civil society and public organisations. On the one hand, there is now a vast literature on transnational protest movements (Della Porta et al. 2006; Della Porta 2009), as well as environmental, human rights and interest-based NGOs (like Greenpeace, the European Network against Racism and the European Trade Union Confederation: Ruzza 2004; Della Sala and Ruzza 2007). Individual participation in these transnational ventures, though, seems still limited and intermittent (Tarrow 2005). On the other hand, Krotz (2007) identifies what he calls ‘parapublic underpinnings of international relations’ – that is, state-financed youth exchanges, municipal partnerships, and a host of institutes and associations promoting cross-border interactions. Even if originating from state initiatives and not addressing EU integration, these interactions are part of a different kind of Europeanisation that goes beyond the narrow EU-centric idea of intra-European practices. Transnationality in Europe does not mean just ‘EU-isation’. In the Franco-German case he studied, Krotz holds that these initiatives ‘make Europeans more European, but not less national’ (ibid., 389): a plausible outcome in line with other research using in-depth interviews (Duchesne and Frognier 2002 and 2008).

Another dimension of governance and everyday life that the literature is especially interested in researching deals with the political and social borders created by the EU’s remaking of spatial and territorial understandings (Anderson and O’Dowd 1999; O’Dowd 2001; Meinhof 2002, 2003, 2004; Berezin 2003; Berezin and Schain 2003; Berezin and Díez Medrano 2007; Bigo and Guild 2005; Eigmüller and Vobruba 2006; Paasi and Prokkola 2008; Roose 2010; Rippl et al. 2010). Border regions are viewed as laboratories of European integration and ‘transnational social capital’. However, even where individuals cross frontiers regularly and build their own personal realm independent of national boundaries, the emergence of a Europeanised self-image is not always straightforward, with other intervening conditions entering into play. In a seminal study, Roose (2010) investigates individual and contextual conditions of transnational societal integration in intra-European border regions. Kuhn (2012) also examines border regions but with a focus on the relationship between transnationalism and Euroscepticism, finding that the impact of cross-border practices on attitudes towards the EU is less relevant in these areas than elsewhere. At a time when EU’s outer limits have been changed continuously with enlargements and intra-EU boundaries have lost their political
salience due to free movement and Schengen, borders embody the dilemma of inclusion and exclusion, as Wallace (2002) so simply and accurately put it (see also Balibar 2004). In Dürrschmidt’s (2006) reflection on global change, that draws on ethnographic fieldwork along the German-Polish frontier, borderlands reveal their double-edged potential, as seedbed for cosmopolitanism because of the ongoing meeting with ‘the other’ or as easy prey of political populism in the face of cultural hybridisation and colonisation. Both processes would suggest that, in opposite directions, borders can act as magnifiers of the effects of Europeanisation and globalisation.

**Cosmopolitanism**

The concept of cosmopolitanism was first introduced by Diogenes who called himself a *kosmopolites* – a ‘citizen of the world’ (Nussbaum 1997, 5). Cosmopolitanism has a long trajectory in social sciences and philosophy, and has been studied from various analytical and normative angles. In fact, according to Vertovec and Cohen (2002), cosmopolitanism as a social science concept has at least six different meanings: a socio-cultural condition, a methodological approach, a philosophy, a political project, a set of attitudes and a set of competences. All these approaches share the common emphasis of ‘world openness, global awareness, loyalty to human kind and recognition of the other’ (Pichler 2009b, 705).

In a nutshell, cosmopolitanism as a socio-cultural condition is a consequence of globalisation and refers to increased international connectedness and interdependence as well as to the permeability of national borders in our days (Beck and Grande 2004). These developments have spurred cultural, religious and political heterogeneity and have raised the awareness for otherness.

‘Methodological cosmopolitanism’ (Beck and Grande 2010; Beck and Szaider 2006) or ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ (Delanty 2006) is an approach that seeks to overcome the limitations of methodological nationalism of contemporary social science. According to Beck and Grande (2010, 427), methodological cosmopolitanism breaks down the entrenched equation: *one society = one culture = one nation = one state* that has dominated the social sciences in the past decades and thus obscured transnational social phenomena.

After its early days in Ancient Greek and Roman writings, cosmopolitanism as a philosophy and normative argument was revived in Kantian philosophy (Nussbaum 1997). Cosmopolitan philosophy claims that all human beings belong to the same global community notwithstanding their ethnic, political, religious and ideological affiliations (Kleingeld and Brown 2006). It is therefore a founding current for modern political ideals such as universal human rights.

Cosmopolitanism as a political project ‘calls for the empowerment of international institutions because of increased global interdependencies’ (Ecker-Ehrhart 2011, 1), that weaken the efficiency and power of the nation state. Some social theorists in the debate have suggested that European integration harness and embody the highest ideals of political cosmopolitanism (Beck and Grande 2007). Indeed, Archibugi (1998, 219)
describes the EU as ‘the first international model which begins to resemble the cosmopolitan model’. Another realisation of political cosmopolitanism is the International Criminal Court, capable of subjecting individuals under international law above and beyond their national legal systems (Kleingeld and Brown 2011).

A recent strand in the literature emphasises ‘real existing cosmopolitanism’ (Weert et al. 2008), i.e. attitudes and behaviour that can be empirically measured. Cosmopolitanism as a set of individual attitudes refers to collective identity and belonging as well as appreciation of otherness (Roudometof 2005; Olofsson and Öhmann 2007; Mau et al. 2008; Pichler 2009a; Haller and Roudometof 2010; Ecker-Ehrhart 2011).

Finally, cosmopolitan competences refer to skills and practices facilitating efficient interactions on an international level. Cosmopolitan competences are conceptually very close to ‘transnational competences’ (Koehn and Rosenau 2002) or ‘transnational linguistic capital’ (Gerhards 2010).

**Dimensions of cosmopolitan attitudes**

For the purpose of our project, the conceptual proximity between cosmopolitan competences and cross-border practices is problematic as it makes it difficult to differentiate between independent (behaviour) and dependent (attitudes) variables. We therefore go along with previous contributors (Mau et al. 2008) and limit our understanding of real existing cosmopolitanism to attitudes while capturing cosmopolitan-related behaviour in the concept of cross-border practices. The background to this work is the systematic cross-national comparisons on the convergence and divergence of values among European populations undertaken by Gerhards (2007).

In a nutshell, cosmopolitan attitudes are held by ‘those who identify more broadly with their continent or with the world as a whole, and who have greater faith in the institutions of global governance’ (Norris 2000, 289). While it might be tempting to expect that increased global interconnectedness automatically leads to more cosmopolitan outlooks among the entire public, it has become clear that globalisation also triggers counter-reactions such as increased ethnocentrism (Roudometof 2005). Institutional border removal makes collective identity even more important to define oneself against a common other (Beck 2002). More recent empirical studies argue that individuals can hold complex attitudes and thus hardly ever can be categorised as only locals or cosmopolitans, a distinction which goes back to Merton’s (1968) classic opposition of ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘locals’ as idealtypes of social actors on the basis of mutually exclusive outlooks. Rather, they can be placed along a cosmopolitan-local continuum (Roudometof 2005). In an analysis of this continuum using data from the ISSP National Identity Modules from 1995 to 2003, Haller and Roudometof (2010) observe a global trend towards less local and more national attachments – with the exception of Europe, where national attachments are declining in favour of European attachments.

Olofsson and Öhmann (2007), however, argue that, both from a theoretical and an empirical standpoint, this continuum is better represented as two separate dimensions. While the first dimension relates to place-oriented attitudes such as attachment at the
local, regional or national level, the second dimension is based on cultural, political and economic openness. They thus identify four groups of people, of which the ‘open globals’ and the ‘local protectionists’ are at opposite ends, while the ‘global protectionists’ and the ‘open locals’ score high on one dimension but low on the other. Their empirical analysis of Swedish survey data finds that the majority of respondents (47% in 2003) are ‘local protectionists’, while only 7% could be classified as ‘open globals’.

The interpretation of the local-cosmopolitan continuum in terms of (lacking) attachment at the local and national level has been criticised, however. It is questionable whether cosmopolitans are indeed detached from lower entities. Rather, cosmopolitans should be seen as individuals that are merely not confined by local or national affiliations. In fact, Ossewaarde (2007, 372) notes that even in Merton’s (1968) original dichotomy the cosmopolitans form part of the local community. In line with this argument, as already discussed, Gustafson (2009) shows that while Swedish frequent international travellers are significantly more willing to move to another country and are more likely to hold a European identity, their local ties and attachment do not significantly differ from the rest of the population.

Similarly to Olofsson and Öhmann, Pichler (2009b) differentiates between ‘subjective/identity’ and ‘objective/orientation’ cosmopolitanism. According to this author, ‘subjective’ cosmopolitanism refers to feelings of attachment or belonging to the world as a whole, while ‘objective’ cosmopolitanism entails open attitudes towards otherness (ibid., 713).

Mau and colleagues (2008) presuppose three interrelated dimensions of cosmopolitan attitudes. The first dimension is based on the recognition of interconnectedness of political communities. The second dimension refers to the awareness of ‘overlapping collective fortunes that require collective solutions locally, regionally and globally’ (ibid., 5). Finally, a third dimension entails the acceptance of difference, diversity and hybridity. The first two dimensions identified by Mau and colleagues are taken up in Ecker-Ehrhart’s (2011) contribution. Analysing German survey data, this author finds that perceptions of transnational interdependence foster the endorsement of global governance, even more so if individuals question the problem-solving capacity of their national government.

In a widely-discussed paper, Calhoun (2002) has argued that cosmopolitan attitudes are an elite phenomenon, confined to a mobile and well-educated upper class. Indeed, the cosmopolitan is often depicted as an upper-middle class professional overcoming local and national boundaries in the search of better living and working conditions elsewhere (Ossewaarde 2007, 372). Cosmopolitan ideals are said to be of little appeal to others than philosophers or highly privileged individuals and societies. However, public opinion research shows that a broad share of the public subscribes to cosmopolitan ideas and that cosmopolitanism is far from being elitist (Furia 2005).
Conclusion: further challenges for the EUCROSS project

Expanding or escaping the Deutschian legacy?

The most promising lines of research regarding Europeanisation, European identity, European transnationalism, the emergence of a European society, and the possibility of cosmopolitanism in Europe, have been empirical studies that build towards large-scale, comparative and systematic accounts of cross-border practices and their consequences in Europe. In most cases, these are works that systematically build on the legacy of Karl Deutsch’s early studies of European regional integration that posited growing cross-border transactions as the fundamental sociological source of integration of supranational ‘communities’ at a macro-regional scale such as the European Union (Deutsch 1954; Deutsch et al. 1957). For Deutsch, greater economic and political cooperation between states would facilitate multiple and growing cross-border social transactions – i.e., personal interactions and movements – at the individual level, which in turn would establish a sense of community – i.e., the emergence of a regional identity – and legitimate further integration.

The ‘Deutschian’ style works discussed here and on which we develop (i.e., Fligstein 2008; Recchi and Favell 2009; Mau 2010; Díez Medrano 2010a; Andreotti and Le Galès 2011; Kuhn 2011) are the cutting edge of a new field. However, there are issues that may be raised about the limitations of the Deutschian legacy, and a question as to whether in fact the legacy may need to be escaped as much as extended.

While Deutsch’s long-term scenario is plausible, it is somewhat out-dated, under-specified and incomplete. One question is immediately posed by the problematic relationship between globalisation and European integration. It is extremely hard, albeit essential, to adjudicate between the impact of broader globalisation (or internationalisation) versus regionally specific Europeanisation, when accounting for underlying causes of change in cross-border transactions and practices (Castells 2000; Fligstein and Mérand 2002). Globalisation appears to overlap with European integration, bringing along opportunities but also risks, such as the delocalisation of jobs, increased migration, and the snowballing of economic crises across national borders. It can be seen to pit winner against losers (Bauman 2000a; Kriesi et al. 2008), and is said to trigger a backlash in terms of strengthening local identities (Eidelson and Lustick 2003). We have to find a way of unpacking the effects of globalisation from those of Europeanisation, as well as charting how this confusion plays out in the mind of EU citizens as they assess the building of the EU.

Specific cross-border practices made possible by the EU legal and political institutions should, it is often argued, foster positive European identifications (Rother and Nebe 2009). However, the linkage between Europeanised practices and identification with the EU is not a linear or straightforward mechanism, being confounded by globalisation or other international identifications, and by how these affect different social groups. Age, gender, education, and social class may all be relevant in this respect. It is not clear whether early socialisation (into an international world view) or later life experiences (via practices and social networks) are the key to these identifications. And globalisation may offer different speeds and scales of internationalisation to those triggered by European
rights and opportunities. For example, it is often observed that compared to other social groups, upper-class, educated and young people now routinely extend their range of experience beyond European borders. They are likely, perhaps, to go to Shanghai or New York as students, workers and holiday makers more often than they are using the opportunities of the European space. Lower-class, lesser-qualified and older people, on the other hand, are more restricted to the European space in terms of cross-border experience, and often suffer the worst ‘externalities’ of global free movement.

A second major weakness of the Deutschian legacy is that it does not take into account immigration into the EU as part of the globalising/Europeanising changes of the last decades. Compared to average EU citizens, non-EU origin residents in Europe are involved in vast transnational networks of transactions that extend well beyond the European space (Soysal 1994). The EU construction sometimes helps their inclusion into European societies (facilitating mobility or the liberalisation of labour markets), but sometimes it explicitly excludes them (locking them out of EU citizenship, or creating the perception of a European fortress). Third-country nationals, who are long-term residents in Europe, have long been the focus of this discussion (Balibar 2001). Yet even new European citizens – that is, citizens from new member states – can feel exclusion when they are barred from the full rights of membership by transitional clauses, or when they experience continued distinctions between West and East in their everyday interactions (Favell and Nebe 2009). Any research on the impact of the EU on Europeanisation in a global/international context must then build in a contrast with the experience of these ‘other’ European groups.

The dilemma of EU legitimacy

A second set of issues for our consideration concerns EU legitimacy, a topic high on the agenda of both EU scholars, policy-makers and public opinions. Despite its wholehearted promotion of democratic values as part of the symbolism and rights attached to European citizenship, the EU has faced a breakdown in the ‘permissive consensus’ of the population (Hooghe and Marks 2008) over further European integration or enlargement, as citizens revolt against and reject identification with the European project. EU policy-makers often feel that there is an unfair ‘gap’ in the public perception of their efforts: if only they could understand the benefits of the practices they have enabled, or the values and symbols they have promoted, then hostile national electorates would not be so sceptical. However, there are many aspects of internationalisation and globalisation in different European contexts, or regarding different social groups, that suggest that the European Union cannot automatically expect individuals to be positively Europeanised merely through experiencing EU-based rights, values, symbols or cultural events.

One of the important issues is to target the most difficult aspect of this missing understanding of why Europeanisation via internationalisation in Europe is not working: the blurred intersection of globalisation and Europeanisation. This is, as is well known, the issue on which hostility towards the EU is often pivoted: the sense that all Europeanisation has brought to people is a feeling of vulnerability and potential decline caused by the opening of protective national European societies to the winds and
unbridled competition of globalisation. In unpicking the actual effects of Europeanisation (i.e., the effects of European citizenship and EU membership), from other internationalising/globalising trends, the EUCROSS project will be able to pinpoint which cross-border social practices are in fact indicators of a distinct, emergent, regional-scale European society, and thus which deserve to be better recognised as an everyday taken-for-granted benefit of EU citizenship.

The exclusionary and/or inclusionary effects of Europeanisation

Thirdly, there is the great fear of European observers that the EU, far from living up to its proclaimed values and cosmopolitan ideas, in fact cements a process of closure to ‘non-European’ cultures and populations as part of its construction. This is a commonplace cry among critics of the EU, as well as many critical theory-inspired scholars who point to the existence of ‘other’ Europes than the EU. It is not a subject, however, that is well researched in systematic, data-based sociological terms. Our study will advance this field of research, by explicitly comparing the likely ‘exclusionary’ experiences of new EU citizens from an economically disadvantaged part of the continent (Romania), as well as non-EU citizens from a country at the heart of many cultural-symbolic debates about the borders of Europe (Turkey), with the everyday ‘international’ experiences of average EU nationals in different member states. It is, in other words, a way to put flesh and blood, as well as systematic statistical evidence, on the burning question of ‘What is Europe?’.

Our project shall therefore also reach towards a missing synthesis of research on internal European mobility and more conventional studies by migration scholars on immigration and transnationalism in Europe. While likely being amongst the most internationalised and globalised of European residents, immigrants in Europe are also subjected to ‘nationalism revivals’ in EU member states, which insist that they abandon their transnationalism and ‘integrate’ into new national identities, severing their primary loyalty to their countries, cultures or (even) social ties of origin. Ironically, these kinds of national ‘integration’ policies are increasingly de riguer in states that would never dream or even be able to impose such bounded socialisation pressures on their own nationals, who have been internationalising and globalising their lives in recent decades. As we well know, more highly privileged citizens – such as the famous ‘transnational elites’ of the professional-executive class in most European countries – are routinely able to travel, move and organise their lives on an international scale that largely escapes the bounds of the countries they come from, even when they still ‘live’ there. Our project will furnish systematic data-based findings about the geography, scale, intensity of internationalisation, in both spatial and non-spatial (i.e., socio-cultural) dimensions, that can both compare ‘elite’ and ‘immigrant’ forms of transnationalism, and offer an understanding of how national societies are responding to this ongoing transformation. We will also find out who in fact is Europeanising the most or fastest amidst the broader opportunities of a globalising world. One possibility is that it will be the less educated, lower-middle classes of Europe who – locked out from the elite’s more global opportunities – are adopting more rapidly European cross-border practices; another, is that the emerging new European migration system – which is calling for more fluid access
to labour from the East rather than further afield – is in fact Europeanising the
transnationalism of Romanians and Turks on a distinctly regional rather than global scale.

The causes and conditions of a ‘European cosmopolitanism’

Finally, there are all the unanswered questions concerning cosmopolitanism. This has
been the other great cause of progressive-minded European thinkers: that the European
project, as a unique experiment in post-national democracy and governance, can –
despite the threats of Fortress Europe or Eurocentrism – actually transcend its origins and
embody the highest ideals of enlightenment cosmopolitanism. A nice dream, perhaps.
But, as the lacunae in the current literature illustrate, how can we understand the
sociological processes by which such cosmopolitanism might appear as a result of the
EU’s promotion of certain rights, values, symbols or notions of culture linked to European
citizenship?

Our study is designed to furnish answers towards these unexplored mechanisms in
European society. Advancing the Deutschian agenda, we should provide evidence of the
actual effects of the full range of cross-national practices and experiences that might be
attributed to the EU’s promotional efforts, including both forms of physical and non-
physical cross border mobilities within Europe. However, we also design the study with
sceptical alternatives in mind. A different, non-spatial vision of Europe is suggested by
other ‘post-modern’ social theorists, who emphasise the emergence of a global world
order based on increasing reflexivity and individualism, organised on the basis of ‘spaces
of flows’ and virtual networks, in which cosmopolitanism could never expect to be found
in any spatially organised regional (or national) place.

Other applications would be suggested by our approach. We know very little about the
actual socio-psychological mechanisms underlying European identification, even when it
does occur. We would be able to answer questions about whether childhood socialisation
or adult-life experiences are more fundamental. The key theoretical question – to which
we will seek to give an empirically grounded answer – is whether experiences cause
cosmopolitanism or a cosmopolitan disposition causes mobile experiences to be chosen.
Arguably, the two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, but their relative weight does
matter both theoretically and with a policy-oriented perspective (e.g., is it more fruitful
for the EU to promote itself among school children or making adults move?).

As works by Mau and associates (2008) and Savage and associates (2005) suggest, a
somewhat different point of view is reached when the research itself is not framed by the
EU as such or made on already ‘highly Europeanised populations’, but rather as an
investigation into the internationalisation and cosmopolitanism of national populations –
who may or may not find the European dimension salient. On this question, rather
different levels of commitment in various countries might be expected. As Savage et al.
(2005) found, for instance, residents in North West England have much more significant
ties with family and friends living in Anglophone parts of the world (e.g. Australasia, North
America, South Africa) than geographically and politically closer areas in Europe. The
strength of these dominant cross-border practices might be an important reason for the
relative Euroscepticism amongst large numbers of British nationals, although research proving this relationship has yet to be made. Regarding business travel, the same study shows that American connections via regular travel for work play a much bigger role in the values and identifications of British executives in the North West of England than more ‘regional’ European ones. Fligstein’s (2008) claim that the European project is largely a conscious intervention by a Europeanised professional-executive class thus needs to be checked against different national contexts, and in relation to EU citizens who might work for multinational organisations based in different parts of the world. These considerations again shall be vital in the development of the EUCROSS project.

In sum, while some examples of data gathering on the Europeanisation of everyday lives can be found, two main theoretical and methodological problems loom large in the literature. First, as this overview of the existing studies on socio-cultural Europeanisation, identity, cross-border practices, and cosmopolitanism reveals, rarely are these concepts treated altogether specifying the link between spatially and culturally situated behaviours on the one hand and collective identifications and value orientations on the other. To achieve this, a step forward in the scope of research design, so to pull all the aforementioned threads, is needed. The second manifest lacuna has in fact to do with the scale of the existing studies. Few are comparative, and none includes simultaneously native and immigrant populations, who in fact may attest of different modalities in which the behaviour-identity link can take place. Bridging these two gaps is precisely the goal of the EUCROSS project.
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